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Abstract 
 
The ‘fractal’ nature of the rise in earnings dispersion is one of its key features and remains a 
puzzle.  In this paper, we offer a new perspective on the causes of changes in earnings 
dispersion, focusing on the role of labour reallocation.  Once we drop the assumption that all 
firms pay a given worker the same, the allocation of workers to firms matters for the 
dispersion of earnings.  This perspective highlights two new factors that can affect the 
dispersion of earnings:  rates of job and worker reallocation, and the nature of the process 
allocating workers to jobs.  We set out a framework capturing this idea and quantify the 
impact of reallocation on earnings dispersion, using a dataset that comprises almost the 
universe of workers and the universe of employers in Maryland.  We show that these factors 
have potentially large effects in general on earnings dispersion.  In the case of Maryland over 
the period 1985-1994, the changing allocation of workers to jobs played a significant role in 
explaining movements in the dispersion of earnings. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Changes in earnings inequality are a well documented feature of the 1980s in the U.S. and a 
number of other countries (see OECD, 1996).  One of the main features that has been cited as 
lying behind this is a rise in the return to skill1.  Beyond this, however, the literature has 
established that a large component of the level and growth in dispersion is within-group 
(Levy and Murnane, 1992; Moffitt 1990, Burtless 1990).  The ‘fractal’ nature of the change is 
one of its key features and remains a puzzle.  In this paper, we offer a different perspective on 
the causes of changes in earnings dispersion, focusing on the role of labour reallocation. 
We argue that the scope for labour reallocation to influence the earnings distribution 
is large.  Once we drop the assumption that all firms pay a given worker the same, the 
allocation of workers to firms matters for the dispersion of earnings.  The continual re-sorting 
of workers across different firms paying different wage premia means that the economic 
process matching workers to firms is an important potential determinant of the nature of the 
earnings distribution.  This perspective highlights two new factors that can affect the 
dispersion of earnings:  rates of job and worker reallocation, and the nature of the process 
allocating workers to jobs.  We set out a framework capturing this idea and quantify the 
impact of reallocation on earnings dispersion, using a dataset which comprises almost the 
universe of workers and the universe of employers in Maryland. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows:  in the next section we briefly and 
selectively summarise the literature on earnings inequality.  Next, in Section 3 we set out the 
relationship between labour reallocation and earnings dispersion.  In Section 4 we describe 
the data, the selection decisions we made and estimation procedures.  Section 5 presents our 
results and Section 6 concludes and discusses the implications of this approach for 
understanding the widening inequality of the 1980s. 
 
 
2.  Background  
 
Of the vast literature on the determination of earnings, the overwhelming majority is 
concerned with modelling the mean.  However, interest in the dispersion of earnings has risen 
alongside the well-established increase in earnings inequality.  One substantial factor in this 
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increase is the rise in within-group inequality, groups typically being defined by gender, age 
and education level.  Levy and Murnane (1992) discuss a number of ideas that have been 
advanced to explain this, but much of the rise remains unexplained. 
One prominent strand in this work argues that the return to unobserved skill has risen. 
One approach is to propose a statistical structure for the underlying unobservable (see for 
example Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993, and Card and Lemieux, 1996); another is to use a 
measure of ability such as test scores (see for example Blackburn and Neumark, 1993, and 
Murnane, Willet and Levy, 1995).  Both of these approaches are useful but both face 
difficulties:  the former in the identifying assumptions required, the latter in the sometimes 
problematic nature of the variables used.  In our approach, we take an observable variable, 
the identity of the worker’s employer, and examine the contribution to changes in earnings 
dispersion by changes in the allocation of workers to firms. 
A number of authors have explored the role of establishment effects on wages.  
Groshen (1991) finds that plant-specific wage differentials explain 27% of residual wage 
variation.  Mitchell (1991) argues that idiosyncratic pay setting practices have become much 
more important, as the role of unionisation and wage ‘contours’ in the economy diminishes.  
Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) use a panel of manufacturing plants to investigate the 
contribution of plant-specific wage effects to the growth in wage inequality.  They find both 
between- and within-plant dispersion to have changed.  Establishment size is a particularly 
important correlate of the change in wage inequality.  Davis and Haltiwanger (1995) have 
revisited the issue of establishment size and wage inequality, and again show size to be a key 
factor.  The argument of these papers is that both the distribution of size and the impact of 
size on earnings have changed over time, and that these facts are part of the explanation of 
rising wage inequality. 
In this paper we explore the contribution to earnings dispersion of workers moving 
between plants that pay differing wage premia.  The idea that the assignment of workers to 
jobs matters for the earnings distribution is not new.  Roy (1951) proposed a model in which 
workers had differing talents in different occupations or sectors.  Their ability in one sector 
could be correlated or not with that in other sectors, and they choose which sector to work in 
simply to maximise income.  The overall earnings distribution will depend on the allocation 
of workers to sectors, which in turn depends through the self-selection mechanism on the 
means, variances and covariance of the ability distributions.  While Roy’s presentation is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
1 See among many others: Bound and Johnson, 1992, Katz and Murphy 1992, Murphy and Welch 1992, and 
Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994. 
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technical, he clearly had a formal model set out; formal treatments are available in Maddala 
(1983), Heckman and Honore (1990) and Sattinger (1993).  This model and related work are 
referred to as assignment models.  The majority of work in this field is theoretical but two 
empirical implementations of the Roy model are provided by Heckman and Sedlacek (1985, 
1990); see also Heckman and Honore (1990) on identification in this model. 
Whilst obviously related, our approach has a different econometric set-up.  In the Roy 
model, as in ours, workers will be paid differing amounts as they move between different 
employers.  But in the Roy model, these differing amounts derive from individual-specific 
ability distributions across jobs.  This implies that two workers both re-assigned between the 
same two employers will in general see their wages change in completely unrelated ways.  In 
our model set out below, wages are decomposed into two components:  the standard human 
capital worker-specific component, common across employers, and an employer-specific 
component, common across workers2.  Hence two workers re-assigned between the same two 
employers will see their wages change by the same (log) amount. 
There is another interesting link between our work and models that descend from 
Roy’s original idea.  Willis (1986) also focuses on the impact on the earnings distribution of 
different worker allocation to different occupations where workers possess different 
individual abilities.  He examines the impact of differential sorting of types of individual 
abilities – positive and negative hierarchical sorting, as well as non-hierarchical sorting.  In a 
related spirit, we examine the impact on the earnings distribution of different types of sorting 
of workers across firms. 
A few recent models have addressed how the changing structure of organisations and 
the technology of production might affect the matching of worker types and firm types  These 
include Kremer’s (1993) O-ring model of production, predicting that with a particular type of 
production function high-skill workers will be matched together.  More recently, Kremer and 
Maskin (1996) have explored the links between the nature of the production technology and 
the degree of segregation by skill between firms.  The key factors are imperfect 
substitutability of skills, the existence of different but complementary tasks, and that these 
tasks are differentially sensitive to skill.  Given this, the distribution of skill types available 
affects the incentives for skill segregation, and hence the effect on earnings inequality.  
Lindbeck and Snower (1996) also discuss the transformation of the production process and 
the implications for inequality. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 Note that this ignores the match-specific component we discuss in the next section; this component is ignored 
in the empirical work as discussed below. 
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These changes clearly have implications for earnings inequality.  If some firms, as the 
literature suggests, pay a high premium and others pay a low premium, then the distribution 
of earnings will depend on how workers are distributed across those firms.  Changes in 
earnings inequality will occur if job reallocation and changes in organisational structure result 
in changes in the differential attachment of high skill workers to high premium firms and low 
wage workers to low wage firms.  The literature has emphasised that changes in the twin 
fundamentals of ‘technology and trade’ can change the skill premium.  We show that they 
can work through other channels:  changes in the allocation of workers to firms, and changes 
in the size and number of high wage firms. 
 
 
3.  The Reallocation of Labour and Earnings Dispersion 
 
In this section we first briefly review models of earnings determination, and secondly show 
how the process of labour reallocation affects the earnings distribution. 
 
3.1  Determination of earnings 
 
Explanations of change in the dispersion of earnings must start from a model of earnings.  
The standard approach is a human capital model: 
 
log wi = b0 + b1Si + b2 sex + b3 race + f (t) + b4 unemp + e i (1)  
 
where wi denotes earnings, Si refers to years of schooling; f(t) is a function of age, and unemp 
is a measure of aggregate labour market activity.  In this framework, a change in the 
dispersion of individual earnings must stem from changes in one of these components, 
namely changes in the weights given to individual characteristics (b’s) and changes in f(.).  
This is the approach that has been taken in explaining the rise in earnings dispersion in the 
U.S. and other countries, with the emphasis being on a rise in the return to skill (b1 rising 
over  time).  As we noted above, however, a large component of the widening of the earnings 
distribution is accounted for by an increase in within-group dispersion.  In terms of (1), this 
arises from changes in the distribution of e, and remains a puzzle. 
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The implicit assumption underlying this approach is that all firms3 pay the same wage 
to a given worker.  However there is a large literature (for example, the efficiency wage 
literature) which relaxes this by introducing incentive or information problems.  We therefore 
reformulate model (1) to allow for different firm-specific wage premia.  We think of each 
individual i as possessing a bundle of skills, b tXit, where the vector X is given by the 
explanatory variables in (1).  The earnings of individual i then depend on her human capital 
bundle, the earnings mark-up of the firm j she is currently working for, and an error term: 
 
wijt = p ijt.(b tXit).exp(eij(i)t) (2) 
 
where p ijt is firm j’s valuation of i’s skills bundle at t4.  This may have two components:  a 
firm specific effect denoted ajt, and match specific effect denoted gij.  In principle we can 
identify a time-varying firm-specific effect, but not a time-varying match specific effect5.  
Taking logs,  
  
log wijt = ajt + gij + log y ij(I) + eij(i)t (3)  
 
where ajt = log ajt, gij = log gijand y it is the index of the human capital bundle, y it = b tXit.  We 
plan to investigate the role of gij in future work, but for now we ignore it. 
 
3.2  Labour reallocation and the distribution of earnings 
 
Clearly, reallocation of workers across job slots from one year to the next has no effect on the 
earnings distribution if all firms pay the same to any given worker.  Under this assumption, 
the earnings distribution is entirely driven by the distribution of human capital variables 
among workers, and the prices given to those characteristics.  The role played by the demand 
side, by firms, technology, trade and so forth, is purely to determine these prices.  This route 
has been followed by many papers, investigating the impact on earnings of technology 
adoption and trade penetration among other things. 
However, if firms do choose different wage mark-ups, the allocation of workers with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
3 In this theoretical discussion, we shall refer to employers as firms. In the empirical work below, note that most 
employers are single establishment entities; see the Data appendix for details. 
4 A more general model would allow the firm-specific premium to differ for each component of the vector X. 
Our dataset does not permit us to investigate that. 
 6
different human capital bundles to firms paying different premia does matter.  We index 
workers by their human capital bundle, y it, and firms by their mark-up, ajt.  There is a static 
element to this and a dynamic element.  The former is the nature of this allocation or 
assignment.  Denote the function describing this allocation or ‘pairing’6 as ft(ajt|y it):  the 
probability of finding a worker with index y it in a firm with mark-up ajt.  For any given set of 
worker skill indices and firm mark-ups, this allocation will influence the earnings 
distribution. 
This makes it clear that reallocation potentially affects the residual variation, that is 
‘within-group’ earnings dispersion.  For a set of workers defined by a particular value of 
y, the dispersion of their earnings depends on the distribution of firm effects they are 
attached to.  If the pairing function ft(ajt|y it) changes, then so will this distribution and hence 
‘within-group’ earnings dispersion will change. 
Strong positive sorting will clearly lead to a more dispersed distribution than random 
sorting.  The economic behaviour underlying ft is the decision by firms on the appropriate 
wage premium and hiring and firing policy (i.e. who to hire or fire), and the job acceptance 
decisions of workers.  If all job slots remained owned by the same firms, and if all workers 
stayed at the same firm, then the earnings distribution would be defined by the distribution of 
y it, the distribution of ajt and ft(ajt|y it). 
But recent research has shown that labour markets are extremely dynamic:  there are 
very high rates of job and worker reallocation (see Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992, Anderson 
and Meyer, 1994, and Burgess, Lane and Stevens, 2000).  This continual resorting of workers 
to job slots also influences the steady state earnings distribution, as new pairs of worker and 
firm indices are always being created and old ones destroyed.  There are three distinct 
components to this. 
First, we can think of pure job reallocation with no net employment growth (as 
defined by Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992) as some proportion of a fixed total of job slots 
changing ownership between firms each period.  This changes the distribution of wage 
premia over the population of job slots (equivalently, the population of workers).  A set of 
workers (defined by their index, y it) are displaced from the declining firms, and a set of 
worker are hired into the growing firms7.  Which workers are selected by which firms 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
5 In practice, data issues force us to assume time-invariant firm-specific effects – see below. 
6 Matching is another appropriate description, but this word is already used in at least two other senses. 
7 In a simple model this would be the same set, but a general model would allow for movement into and out of 
employment. 
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(defined by their wage premium, ajt) and which firms hire which workers will both reflect the 
firms’ desired workforce:  that is, the allocation function described above. 
The second element is turnover of the workforce on top of that arising from job 
reallocation.  We have shown elsewhere (Burgess, Lane and Stevens, 2000) that this worker 
churning is substantial, and indeed dominates job reallocation as a source of worker turnover. 
In this context, churning involves a set of workers being reallocated across a fixed set of job 
slots.  High rates of churning mean that a great deal of this reallocation happens each period. 
The third element is the nature of the reallocation.  This element, which is the 
correlation between the worker type and the firm type, will also influence the distribution of 
earnings, depending on how workers and firms are paired.  We discuss this further below. 
We can illustrate these ideas with a brief example, before setting out a more general 
framework.  Assume that there are a fixed number of workers, indexed 1 through 5, and a 
fixed number of job slots, indexed A through E.  Each worker and each job slot has a fixed 
effect (in this simple example we ignore age, time and labour market conditions).  The 
worker fixed effect is equal to the worker number, and the job fixed effect is indicated in 
parentheses.  Earnings are simply the sum of the worker and job slot fixed effects, so for 
example, worker 1 in job slot A(10) earns 11 units in t and worker 4 in D(1) earns 5.  
Workers are allocated to job slots as follows, and then reallocated in t+1: 
 
 Date: t t+1 
  Workers 
 A (10) 1 1 
Job  B (1) 2 2 
Slots C (1) 3 4 
 D (1) 4 5 
 E (10) 5 3 
 
Note that both job slot and worker fixed effects are constant over time.  Nevertheless, the 
variance of earnings will change over time as a result of worker reshuffling.  The effect of 
such worker reallocation in the example, in t+1 workers 3, 4 and 5 trade places, so worker 5 
now earns 6 units and worker 3 earns 13.  The variance of earnings changes from 21.4 to 14.2 
as a result of the reallocation. 
Job reallocation with no net employment growth, or balanced job creation and 
destruction, can be thought of as job slots swapping between the ownership of different firms.  
So for example, if in t+2 the firm owning job slot A grew by one, and the firm owning job 
slot B died, we can think of the fixed effect of that job slot changing from 1 to 10.  Suppose 
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also that the firm owning D grew by one, and the firm owning E died.  Workers #2 and #3 are 
displaced and subsequently re-hired into the two new jobs, changing the earnings distribution. 
However, this does not isolate the contribution of job creation and destruction on 
earnings dispersion.  The third component in our framework emphasises the importance of 
pairing:  the change in the dispersion depends on how the workers released from the jobs 
destroyed are paired with the new jobs created.  If worker #2 is hired at B and #3 at E, the 
variance is 13.3.  But if they are paired in the opposite manner, the variance is 17.8.  Thus the 
contribution of job reallocation to changes in the earnings distribution is influenced by ft. 
The scope for reallocation to affect the variance of earnings depends on the dispersion 
of worker and firm indices.  If either is close to degenerate, reallocation can only have a 
minor influence.  The actual impact of reallocation depends on two further things:  the 
amount of labour resorting and the nature of the process matching workers and firms.  We 
know the former is huge; we know very little about the latter.  Note that even given constant 
worker and firm indices and constant rates of labour turnover, reallocation can still produce 
changing earnings dispersion if ft(ajt|y it) changes over time. 
To reiterate:  the relaxation of the assumption that all firms pay the same introduces a 
different set of variables that can influence the dispersion of earnings.  These include in 
particular, the degree of job and worker reallocation and the nature of the allocation of 
workers to firms. 
We can use our modified human capital equation, (3) ignoring the gij term, to 
investigate changes in the cross sectional variation in log w it  over time: 
 
vart (log wij) = vart (y i) + vart (ajt) + 2 cov(y i, ajt) + vart (ei) (4) 
      1 2 3 4 
 
This decomposition demonstrates that the earnings distribution can change because the 
distribution of worker indices changes (1), the distribution of firm mark-ups changes (2), the 
allocation of workers across jobs changes, ft(ajt|y it) (3), or because of further unmodelled 
changes (4).  We have suppressed other terms in this expression:  the cross-sectional variance 
in f(t) and in local labour market conditions are zero in our analysis below, but clearly could 
be incorporated; covariances with the error term are assumed zero in this theoretical 
exposition. 
We discuss each of these in detail: 
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(1) The variance of worker indices can change for two reasons.  The first of these is 
changes in the composition of workers, either on a secular or business cycle basis; the 
second is changes in the indices of a given group of workers -  for example, changes 
in the price of skill. 
 
(2)  The variance of firm wage mark-ups can also change for the same two reasons:  a 
change in the composition of firms, or a change in the value of the mark-up among a 
given set of firms.  The former, which essentially refers to changes in the population 
of job slots, can be characterised as the contribution of job creation and destruction,  
“industrial restructuring”, and the entry and exit of firms.  The latter can occur if firms 
adopt new technologies and personnel practices.  It may also include short-term 
adjustments to the premium to reflect labour market conditions.  
 
(3) The covariance term captures the changing allocation of workers to jobs.  This 
covariance is a measure of the outcome of the underlying ‘pairing’ function ft(aj|y i), 
and changes in it therefore reflect changes in the allocation of workers to jobs.  The 
matching of worker human capital indices and firm wage premia is unlikely to be 
random.  It arises from the personnel policies of firms and the job acceptance and 
quitting decisions of workers.  The personnel policies involve the joint determination 
of wage setting, and hiring and firing criteria.  The precise nature of these will depend 
on the specific reason for the failure of the purely competitive model giving rise to 
firm-specific wage mark-ups.  But there is no reason in general to expect that high 
wage workers (high y) will necessarily be associated with high mark-up firms.  High 
mark-ups may arise from asymmetric information and monitoring problems, and it 
may be that these are predominant in low skill jobs. 
 
(4)  This component captures the unexplained residual due to pure time variation.  This 
may include a systematic component reflecting wage changes over the business cycle, 
as well as noise and further changes in the within-group residual. 
 
The nature of ft(ajt|y it) is determined by firms’ optimal personnel policies and the 
reallocation process in the labour market.  We briefly set out a model to highlight the main 
points. 
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A firm faces an environment characterised by a particular set of possible technologies, 
the nature of its product demand (volatility for example), and the state of the other markets it 
operates in; denote this set of factors by Mj.  This includes worker churning8:  the firm is 
aware of the relation between churning and its wage premium.  Workers differ in observable 
skill levels.  Part of the optimisation problem the firm faces is to decide its personnel policy.  
This comprises the joint determination of the optimal wage premium to pay (a*), and the 
optimal mix of worker types to employ (p*, being the proportion of high skill workers 
employed).  Specific versions of this problem have been widely studied in many contexts (see 
for example, the survey in Parsons, 1986, and more recently and more generally Lazear, 
1996); for our purposes, we simply note the general form of the solution: 
 
 a  j* = a  j*(Mj) (5) 
 p  j* = p  j*(Mj) 
 
This will therefore include the influence of churning. 
The environmental factors (Mj) also stochastically influence the firm’s growth rate, 
though the work of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) also shows the importance of idiosyncratic 
factors.  We suppose that there is a job creation and destruction process that yields a 
distribution of employment levels at a date, conditional on its size at the previous date, its 
environment (Mj), and incorporating a stochastic element.  This is written as njt (njt-1, Mj), 
interpreted to include births and deaths.  For a fixed distribution of Mj, continuous 
application of this transition process will yield a steady state distribution of firm size, albeit 
with any individual firm obeying the employment transition process noted above.  This 
steady state distribution and the transition process also define the steady state distribution of 
M over jobs, say h(M).  Finally, given (5) we can also define a steady-state distribution of 
wage premia and worker types:   
 
 a  * ~ w(M), p  * ~  j (M)  
 
Our emphasis in this paper is on the component of earnings dispersion arising from the 
correlation between worker and firm effects.  This is captured by the relationship between a* 
(the firm wage effect) and p  * (the worker composition of the firm).  This derives from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
8 Churning is defined as amount of worker turnover net of the amount necessary for job reallocation. 
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steady state distributions:   
 
 a  * = c(p  *) =  w(j-1 (p  *)) 
 
The final stage is to note that this function c(.) determines the covariance term (3) 
above.  Thus the functions w(.) and j(.) are crucial to the determination of the variance of 
earnings.  Changes in the set of technology options for example, will change these functions 
and hence the association between a  * and p  *.  The personnel policies of firms, and the 
reallocation of labour between firms, are the main features of our approach to understanding 
earnings dispersion.  We now turn to an empirical implementation of this approach. 
 
 
4.  Data 
 
4.1  Data description 
 
4.1.1  Source 
 
Maryland, like every other state in the U.S. collects quarterly employment and earnings 
information through its State Employment Security Agency to manage its unemployment 
compensation program.  Each quarter more than 100,000 employers report earnings and 
employment for over two million employees.  Each wage record includes both employee and 
employer identifiers, enabling us to construct a quarterly longitudinal dataset on employers.   
The employer’s four digit Standard Industrial Classification is then added from another 
administrative file.  Virtually all business employment in Maryland is covered.  We use data 
from 1985:3 to 1994:3.  While the data have the advantage of being universal and 
longitudinal on both employers and workers, there are drawbacks in that we have no data on 
hours worked, and we have no information on the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
workers.  The data are discussed in more detail in the data appendix. 
 
4.1.2  Construction 
 
We make a series of standard decisions in working with the data.  We follow the approach 
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taken by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993), in defining earnings to be the maximum 
earnings by the individual in a quarter.  This picks out a single employer for each individual 
in any given period and hence ensures that there is a one to one relationship between workers 
and employers in each quarter.  We also follow our previous work and work by Topel and 
Ward (1992), in that we define employment to be full quarter employment and take only 
workers whose earnings exceed 70% of the minimum wage during the quarter.  Although we 
do not observe hours or weeks worked in the dataset, making it possible that earnings 
reported by the employer only reflect partial quarter earnings, our use of full quarter 
employment avoids this problem.  Finally, we could not include all 40 quarters of data, 
because of the memory constraints mentioned above.  Therefore we subset the data one more 
time to only consist of the third quarter of each year. 
However, the type of analysis that is necessary to estimate over 2 million worker and 
200,000 employer fixed effects poses a separate challenge.  Since worker and employer fixed 
effects can be correlated in different ways, they cannot be estimated sequentially.  Similarly, 
the usual approach when faced with the estimation of large numbers of dummy variables, 
deviating from the mean, is not appropriate since there are worker means, employer means, 
and joint means.  Thus the biggest constraint faced in constructing a dataset was the 
maximum number of variables that could be held in computer memory.  This problem is well 
known, and discussed in some detail by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999).  We approach 
the estimation problem in two ways:  one by directly estimating fixed effects; the second 
using one of the techniques described by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (AKM).  We 
compare the outcomes below. 
 
a)  Basic approach 
 
In order to make the analysis manageable, we took a random subset of 4,000 workers who 
were employed in each of the 10 quarters.  The length of the panel is then sufficient to 
estimate parameters with some degree of accuracy.  To identify worker effects we need inter-
firm movement:  of the 4,000 individuals who are the focus of the analysis, 29% are movers 
in the sense that their firm identifier changes at least once:  19.5% have 1, 6.5% have 2 and 
3% have 3 or more changes. 
To identify firm effects, we need intra-firm variation.  To accomplish this, we then 
identified all the 2,426 employers who employed the 4,000 workers during the decade, and 
identified all other workers who worked for those employers in the same quarter as our 4,000 
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workers.  Those 4,724,499 workers were then included in the estimation sample as long as 
they continued working at that firm.  Thus, while we have 10 quarters of data on each of the 
4,000 workers, we do not necessarily have 10 quarters of data on the others.  Table 1(a) 
describes the distribution of quarters worked for the other employees in the dataset.  This 
approach effectively denotes the employers who employed the 4,000 workers during this 
period as the universe:  we include everyone who ever worked for those employers, and no-
one who didn’t.  This is, on a smaller scale, similar to defining geographical boundaries on 
datasets. 
Finally, the distribution of employers is described in Table 1(b).  The drawback to this 
approach is that, while it is possible to accurately estimate the fixed effects of both 
individuals and employers, the choice of the sample is not completely representative of the 
typical employer.  Our employers are, in general, larger and more heavily concentrated in 
manufacturing than employers in general.  However, the choice of sample is quite close to the 
distribution experienced by the typical worker as is evident when the industrial distribution is 
weighted by employment.  The restriction to continuously employed workers also means that 
this sample is not representative.  Both these factors are necessary for data reasons, and not 
uncommon in this literature.  We provide some checks on the likely effects of this approach 
by comparing results from a random sample of workers using the AKM approach. 
Our approach is to specify the individual worker wage index and the firm wage 
premium as dummy variables (one for each worker and one for each firm) and to estimate 
these fixed effects from the data.  Given the size of the dataset, this is not straightforward.  
An alternative, which we also estimate, has been suggested by AKM. 
 
b) AKM approach 
 
AKM  suggest that one way of addressing the size constraint is to choose a matrix, Z, so that 
the individual effects, b  are orthogonal to the projection of the firm effects, a, onto Z.  Once 
Z is chosen, they offer two approaches:  an order independent and an order dependent method 
of recovering the fixed effects. 
The clear advantage to either method is that the choice of the sample is  less 
constrained:  one can choose a subset of firms and then from that a subset of workers in those 
firms.  AKM use readily available proxies for Z:  firm size, its square and 10 industry 
dummies, as do we.  However their method also relies on some within-firm variation:  they 
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also interact individual characteristics (age at the end of schooling and labor force 
experience) with firm characteristics.  We are unable to do this, since we have no information 
on the former and labor force experience in our dataset is severely left truncated. 
We do follow the spirit of their approach, however, with two distinct purposes in 
mind.  First, to compare our approach to theirs, we re-estimate the results for a smaller 
dataset (based on 2,000 workers and 2,729097 observations) using their framework.  Second, 
to explore the sensitivity of the results to the sample selections we are forced to make (by our 
method but not theirs), we then chose a new random sample of 100 employers, and re-
estimate the model using their framework for all workers ever employed by those employers.  
This addresses the problem that by sampling workers first and then their employers in our 
basic approach, we end up over-sampling large employers.  
 
4.1.3  Estimation 
 
The unit of observation is the earnings of an individual in a quarter.  The equation we 
estimate is: 
 
log wijt = aj + b i + d1.t + d2.g + eit (6) 
 
Comparing this with (3) derived above, a number of simplifications forced by the data can be 
noted.  First, the firm mark-up is assumed to be time-invariant.  Second, individual 
characteristics that in general do not vary with time (education level, ability, gender and race 
for example) are collapsed into an individual fixed effect, b i.  This is simply because we do 
not have data on these features.  Note that this assumes that the value of these characteristics 
does not change over time9, mirroring the time invariance assumption for firms’ fixed effects. 
Third, the polynomial in age has to be assumed linear, and is split into the age at which 
individuals are first seen in this window (which goes into the fixed effect) and then a 
common linear component thereafter.  Fourthly, the local labour market conditions are 
measured by including the Maryland aggregate employment growth rate, g.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
9  This is the converse of the usual practice: data constraints mean that we cannot look at temporal variations in 
the return to skill but can look at reallocation, whereas the previous literature had the data to look at the former 
but not the latter. 
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a)  Basic approach 
 
The focus of attention is estimating fixed effects for the 4,000 individuals and the 2,426 
employers who employed them, using the data on the 4.7 million observations.  However, 
computational limitations meant that coefficients on only five variables at a time could be 
estimated.  We thus estimated the model in two steps.  We first created dummy variables for 
five individuals at a time, and created a separate dummy for the other 3,995 workers.  We 
chose those workers who were outside the sample of 4,000 to be the reference group and used 
the absorb command in the SAS GLM procedure to control for firm fixed effects.  We 
repeated this until each of the 4,000 coefficients were estimated.  We then created dummy 
variables for five employers at a time, created a separate dummy for the balance of the 
employers, chose one employer to be the reference group, and used the absorb command in 
the SAS GLM procedure to control for individual fixed effects.  The interpretation of the 
coefficients, then, should be as relative, rather than absolute, fixed effects.  The fixed effects 
on individuals are earnings of these 4,000 over and above the earnings of the group in the 
omitted category. 
There are two technical issues with this approach.  The first is whether it is possible to 
identify the fixed effects.  Table 1(a) demonstrates that there is enough movement of both 
groups of workers (sample and non-sample) across the “universe” of 2426 employers to 
permit the estimation of separate employer fixed effects.  Indeed, over 90% of the employer 
fixed effects were significantly different from zero, suggesting that the data were sufficient to 
separate these effects out.  The second issue is the possibility of correlation between the 
employer premium and the error term.  Clearly if the reallocation of workers across 
employers is random, then this is not an issue.  Although moves are unlikely to be random, 
we are unable to find satisfactory instruments, and simply note the problem and proceed with 
the analysis. 
 
b)  AKM approach 
 
We follow the AKM approach as follows.  For our 2,000 person dataset we estimate the 
person-effects while controlling for the firm proxies for Z (in the manner described above), 
and then estimate the firm effects by directly substituting in the directly estimated individual 
effects into the basic regression (4).  We then compare the results from our approach and the 
AKM approach and find the correlation between them.  We also estimate firm and individual 
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fixed effects for our sample of 100 firms and the 198,667 workers who ever worked for those 
firms, and report the results together with those for our main dataset. 
 
4.2  Trends in earnings inequality in this dataset 
 
In our (complete) base dataset, there is also only a slight change in overall earnings inequality 
for all full quarter workers in Maryland over this period:  see Table 2.  The 4% overall 
increase in the 90/10 ratio hides a great deal of variation by industry sector however:  it is 
evident from the table that earnings inequality actually fell in five sectors of the economy 
(agriculture, manufacturing, transportation communication and utilities, finance insurance 
and real estate and government) while rising in others (wholesale trade, retail trade, 
professional services and other services). 
In our restricted sample of 4000 workers, earnings inequality is (not surprisingly) 
lower than for the sample at large.  The 90/10 ratio shows dispersion falling from 4.17 in 
1985 to 3.80 by 1994.  The disparity between this and the slight rise in the overall figure is 
likely to arise from the fact that this sample necessarily has high labour force attachment, and 
is likely to have above average job tenure.  
 
 
5.  Results 
 
The purpose of this empirical analysis is to quantify the impact of labour reallocation on 
earnings dispersion using the results from the estimation just described.  This will answer the 
question as to whether the new set of factors this perspective introduces as potential 
influences on dispersion are worth further investigation.  We argue that they are.  We also 
look at the actual contribution of labour reallocation to changes in the earnings dispersion in 
Maryland in our decade of data.  We cannot specifically investigate the capability of our 
model to explain events in the U.S. as a whole in the 1980s and 1990s. 
We first present the main results quantifying the potential role of labour reallocation 
on the earnings distribution.  We then turn to examine the actual contribution in Maryland 
over the period 1985 to 1994. 
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5.1  Potential impact of labour reallocation on earnings dispersion. 
 
We noted in section 3 that the scope for reallocation to influence the distribution of earnings 
depends first on the distribution of worker and firm fixed effects.  The estimation yielded 
distributions of these that are not degenerate:  see Figure 2.  This shows that the range of 
values is far from negligible, compared to mean log earnings in the dataset of around 5. 
As a first step, we look at the impact on the variance of earnings if we resorted all 
these individuals across the job slots in a perfectly systematic manner.  The results of this are 
in Table 3 and reveal a very strong effect on dispersion.  Column 1 shows a random 
assignment of workers to firms, and can be compared to a perfect positive sort in column 210 
and a perfect negative sort in column 3.  The numbers show that such complete resorting can 
double or eliminate the variance derived from a random matching. 
However, this is not a realistic exercise, and it is more useful to look at the impact 
using data on labour turnover that approximates U.S. labour markets.  To do this we set up a 
simple simulation of labour reallocation.  There is a fixed population of workers and an equal 
number of job slots; these belong to a smaller number of firms.  Each worker is paired with a 
job slot and the wage is simply the sum of a time-invariant worker component and a time-
invariant firm effect.  We use our estimated distributions for these fixed effects11.  Initially, 
workers are randomly assigned to job slots.  Each year, a given fraction of randomly chosen 
job matches split up12.  These newly unattached workers and jobs re-match in a systematic 
way.  We investigate the impact of the nature and extent of this re-matching on the cross-
sectional variance of wages as this mechanism operates repeatedly. 
The matching process contains the economics of the problem (discussed above), but 
for the purposes of this section we simply treat it as a black box and parameterise it as 
follows.  We rank the unattached workers in terms of their fixed effect; similarly for the 
unattached job slots.  We then perturb the worker ranking by adding k*e, where e is a 
standard normal random variable and k is the parameter we vary13.  Workers and firms are 
then re-matched on the basis of this new ranking.  At k = 0, the two sides of the market are 
perfectly matched, injecting a high degree of correlation14 into the market as a whole.  As k is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
10 That is, the highest ranked worker is allocated to the highest ranked firm, and so on. 
11 Replicated tenfold to give a bigger sample for the randomisation discussed below to work on. 
12 Clearly, having some systematic component in separations that was consistent with the systematic component 
in hiring would simply make our point more strongly. 
13 Obviously there are many ways of adding noise to the ranking. 
14 It is the values of the fixed effects (not the rank) that matter for the variance of wages; these will be highly but 
not perfectly correlated. 
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increased, more noise is added to the ranking and consequently the correlation between the 
fixed effects of the new hires and their firms is lower.  Clearly, as this separating and 
resorting process is repeated, the correlation of the fixed effects across the market as a whole 
converges on that of the matching process. 
The base case for these simulations is a steady state of random allocation and 
reallocation.  This produces a variance of wages of 0.43 (the sum of the variance of 
individual fixed effects of 0.175 and the variance of firm fixed effects of 0.260).  The main 
experiment is to show the impact of different reallocation functions, see Panel A of Figure 1.  
This is based on taking a reallocation rate of 40% per year, and changing k to achieve a 
steady state covariance between the fixed effects of 0.02, 0.04 and 0.08.  The effect on the 
variance of wages is easily deduced from equation (1):  the change in the variance will be 
equal to twice the change in this covariance.  So relative to the initial value, small changes in 
the covariance of the fixed effects produce relatively large changes in the variance.  The new 
steady state is achieved after about 10 years, by when the market correlation fully reflects the 
reallocation function. 
The second experiment is to see how the rate of reallocation, coupled with a particular 
reallocation function, affects the fixed effect covariance and hence the variance of wages.  
We chose to use the rates of 20%, 40% and 60%.  The rate of reallocation will affect the 
speed with which the steady state distribution is approached, but also may affect the steady 
state covariance itself.  Examples are shown in panels B and C of Figure 1.  Panel B is drawn 
with k = 0, i.e. perfect ranking, and shows that the paths for different reallocation rates 
converge at different speeds on the same steady state.  Given the time span (the reallocation 
rates approximate those of U.S. labour markets in an annual time frame), this suggests that 
differences in labour reallocation rate will affect the cross-sectional variance of wages in the 
transition from one steady state to another.  The result also suggests that differences between 
industries in labour reallocation rates will be reflected in differences in variance of wages 
during transitions between steady states.  Panel C shows a different case:  at a covariance of 
0.04, the reallocation rate influences the steady state variance.  This is perhaps a less expected 
result, but can be understood as follows.  A higher reallocation rate yields a bigger pool of 
fixed effects that can be re-matched, hence a higher chance of picking the (absolutely) larger 
values.  Consequently, combining these even with a low correlation will imply a higher 
variance.  Conversely, a low reallocation rate will have only a low probability of picking 
some non-central values and hence will produce a lower variance.  When the correlation is 
very high (as in Panel B), this effect is blunted by the fact that the whole population rapidly 
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becomes highly sorted. 
To summarise:  these simple simulations, using estimated labour reallocation rates 
and fixed effect distributions, show that changes in the process of labour reallocation can 
have substantial effects on the dispersion of earnings. 
 
5.2  Actual contribution of changing allocation to changes in earnings dispersion 
 
We now turn to consider the actual contribution of changes in the allocation process to 
changes in the dispersion of earnings in our dataset.  Over the period as a whole the variance 
of worker fixed effects accounted for some 55% of the variance of log wages, and firm 
effects around 35%.  The remainder is mostly accounted for by the error, with all covariances 
being generally small. 
It is the size of the correlation between firm and worker effects that we are most 
concerned with here.  This is small and negative in this dataset.  Figure 2 cross-plots the 
individual and worker fixed effects at one particular date (1994), and shows clearly that there 
is no strong pattern.  Figure 3 compares changes in the workers’ employers in terms of their 
fixed effects over the decade.  Most workers stayed with the same employer, many had 
moved (not necessarily directly, and not necessarily voluntarily) to higher fixed effect firms 
and some had moved to lower fixed effect firms. 
We are interested in changes in the dispersion of earnings over time and the 
contribution to that of changes in the allocation of workers to firms.  We showed above that 
relatively small changes in this allocation could have substantial impacts on earnings 
dispersion.  Figure 4 plots the variance of log wages and the correlation between worker and 
firm fixed effects over the ten years of our data.  We see that the pattern in its change over 
time is very closely mirrored by the change in the variance15.  This provides some evidence 
that changes in the allocation of workers to job slots are associated with changes in the 
dispersion of earnings. 
However, there are other components of the variance of log earnings and we must 
consider those too.  Since we have imposed in our estimation the assumption that the worker 
fixed effects are constant over time and taken a fixed set of continuously employed workers, 
clearly the cross-sectional variation in these fixed effects is the same in each year.  However, 
while the fixed effect of any particular firm is fixed, since workers move among the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
15 This is not an artefact of using the variance: Appendix figure 1 shows that the 90/10 ratio of earnings follows 
the same pattern too. 
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population of firms, the cross-sectional variance of wage premia of firms currently occupied 
by our sample of workers is not fixed.  However, in practice, variation in this is negligible. 
The simulations suggest that the allocation function, the job reallocation rate and the 
churning flow rate may have an impact on earnings dispersion.  We attempt to separate out 
the contribution of these factors in a very simple way by regressing vart (log wi) (the cross-
sectional variance of log earnings at t) on covt  (y i,aj) (the covariance of firm and worker 
effects at t), and JRR (job reallocation rate) and CFR (churning flow rate)16.  The results of 
this regression on the 10 data points for 1985 - 1994 are in panel A of Table 4.  They support 
the idea that there is a strong association between the changing pattern of worker/firm 
allocation and changing earnings dispersion.  This exercise is simply designed to summarise 
the relationship between the time series change in the cross-sectional variation in earnings 
and the time series change in the covariance of worker and firm fixed effects.  To re-
emphasise, we are saying that changing allocation appears to be playing an important role in 
affecting the earnings distribution; we are unable to investigate (because of data constraints) 
whether this contribution remains important once we allow for changing worker fixed effects. 
If ft(ajt| y it) depends on production and organisational technology, it seems likely that 
this varies between industry.  Our final piece of analysis exploits this idea and examines 
earnings dispersion and the covariance of worker and firm effects by major industry group.  
Figure 5 plots out the estimated correlation over time for the 9 major groups.  We see that in 
the Retail Trade and Other Services industries (groups 5 and 7), the correlation is 
significantly negative and falls quite sharply, while in FIRE (group 6) it rises over the decade.  
This suggests quite plausibly that the nature of the optimal personnel decisions may differ 
between industries and may change in different ways in response to a changing environment.  
In Figure 6, we match this up with the movement in vart(log wi) within each industry; again, 
there is some evidence that the two move together.  We test this using regression analysis, in 
Table 4, panel B.  These results use the 81 observations available from 9 years times 9 
industries.  The results confirm that the covariance is a significant factor in explaining 
earnings dispersion.  They also show that the industry-specific job reallocation and churning 
rates do not appear to matter. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
16 Note that this is not a variance-decomposition exercise on equation (4), nor is (4) an identity: in the data, all 
the other  covariances may be non-zero, and the error variance may not be constant. 
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5.3  Comparisons using the AKM approach and random sample.  
 
We performed two major sensitivity checks on our results.  First, we took a dataset based 
around 2,000 workers chosen according to the sample selection criteria noted above; this 
produced a total of 2,729,097 observations on 468,549 individuals.  We estimated worker and 
firm fixed effects on this dataset using both our approach and the AKM approach, and 
compared the outcomes.  The correlation between the worker fixed effects is very high, 0.82.  
The correlation between the firm fixed effects using the two approaches is substantially 
lower, 0.45.  We ascribe most of this difference to the problem with finding satisfactory 
instruments for Z.  Although our approach directly estimates the employer and worker fixed 
effects, it is clear that our sample selection criteria, while delivering a sharp investigation of 
our approach, do not pretend to deliver a purely random sample of  workers.  But we want to 
consider whether it seriously biases the results.  So we also re-estimated using a sample of 
100 randomly chosen employers and their employees using the AKM approach.  Our 
previous analysis suggests, however, that the gain in representativeness comes at the cost of 
noisier employer fixed effect estimates.  Taking the resulting estimates of worker and firm 
fixed effects, we re-ran the regressions reported in Table 4.  The key covariance term 
remained significant, indicating that our main results are not an artefact of our sample 
selection criteria. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has provided a different perspective on changes in the dispersion of earnings, 
particularly changes in within-group inequality, focusing on the influence of the reallocation 
of labour.  We argue that this introduces a new set of factors that determine the steady state 
distribution of earnings.  These are principally the rates of job reallocation and worker 
reallocation, and the nature of the economic behaviour allocating particular workers to 
particular jobs.  We show that these can have a quantitatively large impact on earnings 
dispersion.  We also show that the changes we estimate in the outcome of this allocation 
mechanism play a significant role in explaining movements in the variance of log earnings in 
our dataset. 
We can finally speculate about the implications of this for the changes in earnings 
inequality experienced in the U.S. during the 1980s.  It is possible, for example, that the 
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change in inequality during the 1980s was the result of a change from one steady state to 
another.  This may have manifested itself in different ways.  The literature has exhaustively 
investigated potential changes in the skill premium itself.  We explore different possibilities. 
For example, changes in technology may have resulted in a change in the pairing between 
workers and firms - in our notation, a different f(.) - as has been suggested by Kremer and 
Maskin (1996).  Or alternatively, changes in trade may have resulted changes in the sizes of 
firms with a given wage premium.  Finally, there may have been a change in the amount of 
labour reallocation. 
The contribution of this paper has been to raise each of these possibilities, and to 
establish that, at least in Maryland, labour reallocation and rematching played a significant 
role in explaining changes in earnings dispersion.  This result is robust to different sample 
choices and different estimation techniques. 
 
 
 23 
Table 1(a):  Characteristics of Workers  
 
 Sample Dataset 4,000 
individuals  
Median Earnings 4812 7180 
Number of employers:   
1 78.5 70.5 
2 16.4 19.6 
3+ 5.1 7.9 
 
Source:  authors’ data 
 
 
 
Table 1(b):  Characteristics of Employers  
 
 The 2426 Employers All Employers 
Industry distribution (%): Unweighted Weighted by 
Employment 
Unweighted Weighted by 
Employment 
Ag., Min 10.3 9.1 15.1 12.8 
Manufacturing 11.1 9.9 3.3 9.7 
TCU 4.2 6.4 3.7 5.8 
Wholesale Trade 11.0 3.4 9.9 6.5 
Retail Trade 14.2 9.3 18.8 15.5 
FIRE 9.4 6.3 7.3 6.2 
Other Services 17.6 34.8 18.8 23.8 
Professional Services 13.0 6.0 21.3 12.6 
Government 9.2 14.7 1.9 7.0 
Average Employment 262.15 18.69 
 
Source:  authors’ data 
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Table 2:  Earnings Inequality in Maryland 
 
90/10 ratio 1985 1994 Change 
Overall 9.33 9.70 4.06% 
Ag,Min 7.00 6.49 -7.33% 
Manufacturing 4.53 4.43 -2.18% 
TCU 8.99 8.12 -9.69% 
Wholesale Trade 6.12 6.56 7.27% 
Retail Trade 10.68 11.17 4.68% 
FIRE 5.49 5.24 -4.47% 
Prof. Services 9.85 11.03 12.00% 
Other Services 12.63 13.10 3.70% 
Government 4.27 3.67 -14.17% 
 
Source:  authors’ data. 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Potential Impact of Reallocation on Inequality 
 
 Simulated Matching 
 Random Perfect positive 
Sorting 
Perfect negative 
Sorting 
var (bi + aj) 0.257 0.501 0.009 
cov (bi , aj) 0 0.122 -0.124 
Mean (bi + aj) 0.713 0.713 0.713 
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Table 4:  Regressions for Cross-Sectional Variance of Log Earnings 
 
Sample:  1985 - 1994 
Dependent variable:  cross-sectional variance of log earnings 
 
AGGREGATE 
Unit = year 
Obs = 10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Covariance 8.965 (7.3) 13.481 (6.7) 13.227 (4.5) 8.239 (5.5) 
JRR -  0.467 (0.5) 0.520 (0.5) -  
CFR -  -0.281 (0.9) -0.300 (0.8) -  
g -  -  0.105 (0.1) 0.556 (0.9) 
Adj. R2 0.853 0.859 0.824 0.848 
 
 
 
DISAGGREGATE 
Unit = industry-year 
Obs = 81 
Regression includes industry dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Covariance 1.594  (3.8) 1.327 (2.8) 1.193 (2.5) 1.406 (3.2) 
JRR -  -0.031 (0.1) -0.062 (0.2) -  
CFR -  -0.022 (0.2) -0.074 (0.7) -  
g -  -  0.857 (1.4) 0.830 (1.5) 
Adj. R2 0.920 0.920 0.921 0.921 
 
Notes: Tables give coefficient and t-statistic 
 Excluding industry group 0, because Figure 6 shows it to be an outlier; including it 
simply strengthens our results. 
Cov = Covariance of worker and firm fixed effect 
JRR =  Job Reallocation Rate 
CFR =  Churning Flow Rate 
g = Aggregate (Maryland) employment growth rate 
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Figure 1:  Simulated Changes in Earnings Inequality 
 
 
 
Panel A:  Differences in the Matching of Workers and Firms 
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Panel B:  Differences in the Reallocation Rate with perfect matching 
of Workers and Firms 
Year
 Realloc Rate = 20%  Realloc Rate = 40%
 Realloc Rate = 60%
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Panel C:  Differences in the Reallocation Rate with matching 
of Workers and Firms at Cov = 0.04 
Year
 Realloc Rate = 20%  Realloc Rate = 40%
 Realloc Rate = 60%
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Figure 2:  Worker and Firm Effects in 1994 
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Note:  each observation is a worker and the coordinates are given by that worker’s individual 
fixed effect and the fixed effect of that worker’s employer in 1994. 
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Figure 3:  Change in Firm Fixed Effects between 1985 and 1994 
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Note:  each observation is a worker, and the coordinates are given by the fixed effect of that 
worker’s employer in 1985 and the fixed effect of that worker’s employer in 1994.  Points 
above a 45o line therefore represent workers moving to a higher fixed effect firm. 
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Figure 4:  Variance of log earnings and 
Correlation of firm and worker fixed effects 
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Note the split scale:  variance of log wages is the left scale, covariance of firm and worker 
fixed effects is the right scale. 
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Figure 5:  Correlation of Worker and Firm Effects by Industry Group 
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Figure 6:  Earnings Variance and Correlation of Worker  
and Firm Effects by Industry 
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On a different scale: 
 
 
 
Group 0
Year
 Variance log_w  Corr'n between Worker and Firm 
85 90 95
0
.5
1
1.5
0
.5
1
1.5
 32 
Data Appendix 
 
Maryland, like every other state except New York, collects quarterly employment and 
earnings information in order for the State Employment Security Agency to manage the state 
unemployment compensation program.  These UI wage records cover virtually all (over 90%) 
employment in the labor market.17  Each wage-record includes an employee's social security 
number, a unique employer identification number and the employee's total earnings during 
the reference quarter.  The employer's total employment level and four-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification code are acquired from administrative units within the state and 
merged with the wage data elements.  All private sector employers who employ one or more 
paid employees are required to file quarterly reports, as are state and local government 
agencies.  Only federal civilian and military personnel, employees of the U.S. Postal Service, 
railroad employees, employees of religious and philanthropic organizations, self-employed 
individuals, those who receive only commissions and some agricultural employees are not 
covered. 
Total wages, including tips, commissions and bonuses are covered, up to a ceiling of 
$100,000 per quarter.  In other words, virtually all business employment is covered and 
virtually all earnings are subject to required reporting.  These administrative records are 
confidential.  Public release of the identity of any individual or reporting business is strictly 
prohibited.  The employer reporting unit is usually the firm, but also government and 
nonprofit organizations.  Over 90% of organizations are single establishment employers.  Of 
the remaining organizations, the reporting unit sometimes encompasses all establishments 
and sometimes only some establishments. 
The data in this paper are subject to several limitations.  They are not directly 
comparable with earnings inequality measures derived from national household surveys.  
Since the data in this paper deal with employers only in Maryland, the results may not 
necessarily extrapolate to the country as a whole.  In the case of the largest organizations, 
reporting units are not firms.  Another limitation is the absence of data on hours worked:  the 
reports provide information only on quarterly earnings.  As a result, some workers may have 
low earnings not because of their low hourly earnings but because they leave the state or the 
labor force or they spend time frictionally unemployed moving from one job to another 
during a quarter.  In order to reduce the possibility that we are capturing sequential rather 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
17 The wage records are archived in a secure environment for research purposes through an agreement between 
 33 
than concurrent multiple job holding,  we follow Topel and Ward in only looking at full 
quarter job spells18. 
The employer data do not include information on worker characteristics.  The data do, 
however, have a number of advantages over household survey data.  Recall error is less likely 
when earnings and industry affiliation are reported by employers, rather than by households.  
Second, the focus on the earnings in jobs rather than of individuals who possibly fill multiple 
jobs, documents another dimension of earnings inequality. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Maryland's Department of Economic and Employment and University of Baltimore. 
18 In other words, for a job spell to be included in this analysis, a worker must have had positive earnings with 
the employer in both the quarter before and the quarter after the quarter in question.  This means that we 
minimize the possibility of having partial quarter earnings and employment spells. 
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